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Individual differencesa b s t r a c t
In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of
their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reﬂects a change in the
quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can
be difﬁcult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls
for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simulta-
neously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias
with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modiﬁed so that
only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable
conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the qual-
ity of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this ﬁnding, showing that
the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive
style. Although the positive ﬁndings of Experiments 3–5 are most relevant to the debate
about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null ﬁndings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer
insight into how the presentation of an argument inﬂuences the manner in which people
reason.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
An argument is logically valid if its conclusion necessar-
ily follows from its premises. From a normative standpoint,
the logical status of an argument is determined exclusively
by its structure. Nevertheless, it is well known that other
factors routinely inﬂuence peoples’ judgments of argument
validity. One of the most important of these is the extent to
which the conclusion of an argument conforms with a
person’s pre-existing view of the world. People tend to
be easily persuaded by invalid arguments that ﬁt their
beliefs yet are likely to resist valid arguments that oppose
their beliefs. This phenomenon is known as belief bias
(Wilkins, 1928).Numerous psychological theories have been developed
to account for belief bias in syllogistic reasoning (e.g.,
Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Quayle & Ball, 2000;
Thompson, Striemer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003).
Mental model theory (MMT; Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, &
Garnham, 1989) holds that people construct mental mod-
els to simulate the components of an argument. When
faced with unbelievable conclusions, they engage in a
more thorough search for alternative models, improving
the likelihood of arriving at the normatively correct con-
clusion. Selective processing theory (SPT; Evans, Handley,
& Harper, 2001; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000) posits
that reasoning strategy depends on conclusion believabil-
ity: people attempt to conﬁrm believable conclusions but
disconﬁrm unbelievable ones. According to dual process
theories like those described by Evans (2007), unbelievable
conclusions may recruit additional, reﬂective processing.
All of these theories suggest that conclusion believability
can inﬂuence the quality of reasoning. However, it is also
1 The procedure does allow one form of bias: participants could show an
arbitrary preference for the right or left display position. Spatial position
bias was examined in our analysis.
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inﬂuence independent of reasoning quality in the form of
a heuristic tendency to accept believable and reject unbe-
lievable conclusions. Such a tendency is a response bias
that affects the pattern of validity judgments without
altering their overall accuracy. Of course, a simple alterna-
tive to the theories described above is that the effect of
beliefs is purely one of response bias. Recent work by
Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) suggests that this alterna-
tive view of belief bias is not only viable but one that tra-
ditional methods of analysis make difﬁcult to rule out.
In a typical belief bias experiment, participants judge
the logical validity of conclusions that vary in their congru-
ence with prior belief. Analysis has traditionally focused on
three aspects of these endorsement rates (e.g., Evans &
Curtis-Holmes, 2005). The main effect of logic, the ten-
dency to endorse valid over invalid conclusions, indicates
deductive reasoning capacity. The main effect of belief,
the tendency to endorse believable over unbelievable con-
clusions, is thought to be driven by a belief-based heuristic.
Finally, a logic  belief interaction is taken as evidence for
a qualitative effect of beliefs on reasoning that goes beyond
response bias. Although it might seem intuitively
reasonable, this manner of interpreting the data has been
the subject of recent critical attention. In particular, the
conclusion that a logic  belief interaction necessarily sig-
niﬁes a change in the quality of reasoning requires
assumptions about the nature of the underlying processes
that may not be justiﬁed (Dube et al., 2010; Klauer et al.,
2000). This is a serious issue given that much of the theo-
retical debate surrounding belief bias has centered on evi-
dence for this interaction.
Are there alternative ways of determining whether a
change in the pattern of endorsement rates is the result
of a change in the quality of reasoning, as the major theo-
ries of belief bias suggest, rather than a change in response
bias? Although making the distinction is theoretically
critical, it is not straightforward. Some recent studies of
syllogistic reasoning have turned to signal detection theory
(SDT; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) in order to model the
effect of beliefs on accuracy and response bias (Dube et al.,
2010; Heit & Rotello, 2014; Trippas, Handley, & Verde,
2013, 2014). In the SDT model, the reasoning process yields
evidence of validity that is represented as a continuous
strength variable. Valid and invalid arguments are
described by distributions of evidence strength. People
judge validity by setting a criterion which evidence must
exceed if an argument is to be endorsed as ‘‘valid.’’ The
endorsement rates are determined by the proportions of
the distributions that exceed the criterion. Accuracy
depends on the overlap of the evidence distributions.
When a change in the reasoning process brings about sep-
aration of the distributions, this alters the pattern of
endorsement rates and, more importantly, improves
accuracy. A shift in response bias that makes the criterion
more liberal or conservative also alters the pattern of
endorsement rates but will not affect accuracy. An effect
on judgment accuracy indicates that something other than
response bias is at work.
A commonly used SDT tool for examining movement
in evidence distributions is the receiver operatingcharacteristic (ROC) which plots the ratio of hits and false
alarms at several levels of conﬁdence, allowing inferences
to be made about the distributions. Dube et al.’s (2010)
analysis of ROCs in syllogistic reasoning showed no effect
of conclusion believability on accuracy, a result consistent
with a pure response bias account of belief bias. Dube et al.
also pointed out that the shape of empirical ROCs argues
against the validity of drawing conclusions about accuracy
based on a logic  belief interaction in endorsement rates.
According to the SDT model, such an interaction could
come about entirely as a result of response bias. In a fol-
low-up study using similar methods, Trippas et al. (2013)
partly replicated their ﬁndings but found that under some
conditions, such as with higher cognitive ability and rela-
tively complex problem types, effects of beliefs on reason-
ing quality did emerge.
The ROC ﬁndings offer somewhat inconsistent support
for theories of belief bias that posit qualitative effects on
reasoning. The ROC method also has several potential
shortcomings. One is practicality. The method requires
capturing performance over a range of criterion levels. This
can be achieved by collecting conﬁdence ratings alongside
validity judgments or by manipulating response bias
across multiple groups. Either method is data-intensive
and time consuming, and the subsequent analysis is more
complex than dealing with a single set of endorsement
rates. Collecting conﬁdence ratings is the more popular of
the two methods because it allows a within-subjects treat-
ment. However, the source of conﬁdence in syllogistic
reasoning has not been extensively studied. There is evi-
dence for alignment between normative responding and
conﬁdence-type judgements (e.g., De Neys, 2012;
Morsanyi & Handley, 2012), but conﬁdence may not
always be related to accuracy (Shynkaruk & Thompson,
2006). Finally, there is ongoing debate about whether
SDT provides the optimum model for empirical ROCs
(Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2011; Klauer & Kellen, 2011).
1.1. The forced choice method
Forced choice is a procedure commonly used in
domains such as perception and memory. Although it has
not to our knowledge been applied to the study of syllogis-
tic reasoning, its properties make it ideal for investigating
belief bias. In the traditional single-probe procedure,
participants are presented with individual syllogisms and
must decide whether the conclusion is valid or invalid. In
the forced choice procedure which we introduce here,
two syllogisms are presented side by side and the partici-
pant must decide which of the two has the valid conclu-
sion. The procedure is not much more complex than the
traditional one, and the dependent measure, proportion
correct, is simple and straightforward to interpret. Most
importantly, forced choice offers a means of isolating
changes in reasoning from changes in response bias by
removing the latter from the decision process. This is done
by equating the believability of competing conclusions.1
Table 1
Examples of the believable and unbelievable problem types used in
Experiment 1.
Problem type Valid syllogism Invalid syllogism
Believable Some animals are
piffures
Some dogs are piffures
No piffures are dogs No piffures are animals
Some animals are not
dogs
Some animals are not
dogs
Unbelievable Some dogs are piffures Some animals are
piffures
No piffures are animals No piffures are dogs
Some dogs are not
animals
Some dogs are not
animals
Note: In the actual Experiments all four ﬁgures and both conclusion
directions were used. The valid argument was presented on the left half
the time and on the right half the time.
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believable condition, the two simultaneously presented con-
clusions are both believable. In the unbelievable condition,
the conclusions are both unbelievable. Prior beliefs no
longer provide a clear and easy basis for judging validity.
Because a preference for endorsing believable conclusions
can have no differential effect on believable and unbeliev-
able trials, any difference in accuracy between the condi-
tions can be attributed to the inﬂuence of conclusion
believability on the way that people reason.
In the experiments to follow, the focus will be on the
empirical question of whether beliefs affect validity judg-
ments in the absence of response bias. Because the logic
of excluding response bias with forced choice is theoreti-
cally neutral, the method also offers a way to provide con-
verging support for the conclusion drawn from ROC
analysis that unbelievable arguments encourage better
reasoning in a manner mediated by cognitive ability
(Trippas et al., 2013).
2. Experiment 1
We tailored the forced choice method to syllogistic rea-
soning as follows. Each trial consisted of two simulta-
neously presented syllogisms, one of which was logically
valid and the other logically invalid. Participants were
instructed to reason about both syllogisms and to choose
the valid one. The inﬂuence of beliefs on the reasoning pro-
cess was examined by comparing the accuracy of judg-
ments in two conditions. In the believable condition,
both arguments had believable conclusions (top row of
Table 1). In the unbelievable condition, both arguments
had unbelievable conclusions (bottom row of Table 1). If
belief bias is no more than a heuristic tendency to prefer
believable over unbelievable conclusions, accuracy should
be the same in both conditions. On the other hand, if peo-
ple reason more effectively when confronted with unbe-
lievable conclusions as some theories suggest, accuracy
should be higher in the unbelievable conclusion condition.
In addition to the believable and unbelievable conditions, a
neutral condition in which end terms were replaced with
nonsense words was added to serve as a baseline.2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
A total of 22 participants took part in exchange for
course credit. Seven participants were male and 15 were
female (age 18–31, M = 21, SD = 3).
2.1.2. Materials
A list containing 48 problems was created to be used as
stimuli. Every problem consisted of two syllogisms
presented side by side. The two syllogisms always had
identical conclusions. One syllogism was always valid
and the other one was always invalid. The valid argument
was presented equally often in the left and right positions.
Sixteen argument structures taken from Dube et al. (2010)
were repeated three times. Half of these were valid and
half were (indeterminately) invalid. All syllogisms were
complex, meaning that multiple representations of the
premises could be constructed. Potential unwanted effects
of problem content were controlled for by randomly
assigning the problem contents to the syllogisms for each
participant anew (Trippas et al., 2013). This resulted in a
unique problem list for every participant. Conclusion
believability was manipulated by combining sixteen
superordinate categories (e.g., birds) with two subordinate
members of each those categories (e.g., parrots and spar-
rows; see Appendix A for the full list).
Believable, unbelievable and neutral problem types
were created to be used as stimuli. Believable problem
trials featured a valid–believable syllogism beside an inva-
lid–believable one (see the top panel of Table 1 for an
example). Believable conclusions were created by present-
ing the superordinate category before a subordinate mem-
ber of that category (e.g., some birds are not parrots).
Unbelievable problem trials featured a valid–unbelievable
syllogism next to an invalid–unbelievable one. Unbeliev-
able conclusions were created by reversing the assignment
order used in the believable case (e.g., some parrots are not
birds). We controlled for premise believability using non-
sense words for middle terms (Newstead, Pollard, Evans,
& Allen, 1992). Forty-eight pseudowords (Appendix A)
were generated (Keuleers & Brysbaert, 2010) and randomly
assigned to the middle terms of the syllogisms. Neutral
problems consisted of a valid–neutral syllogism next to
an invalid–neutral one. Neutral conclusions were created
by presenting two pseudowords (e.g., some fromps are
not blarks). The middle-term of the premises of neutral
problems was always assigned a randomly chosen subordi-
nate member that was unused in the believable and
unbelievable problem types. Combining these syllogistic
structures and item contents yielded a uniquely random-
ised list of 48 problems (16 of each type) for every
participant.
2.1.3. Procedure
The participants were tested on individual computers in
small groups. Upon entering the lab, they were randomly
assigned to a computer and were told to read an instruc-
tion sheet which brieﬂy explained the nature of the task.
The sheet contained a deﬁnition of logical validity which
stressed that participants should assume the truth of the
Table 2
Log Odds and Proportion Correct in Experiment 1.
Believable Unbelievable Neutral
Log Odds 0.76 (0.16) 0.87 (0.24) 0.71 (0.16)
Proportion Correct .68 .70 .67
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Proportions correct are marginal
means calculated on the basis of the log odds. Contrast coding was used
such that each log odds is calculated based on deﬂection from the grand
mean.
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conclusion necessarily followed from this premises. An
example of a valid and an invalid syllogism was provided.
Further instructions were presented on the screen:
‘‘In the following experiment you will repeatedly be
presented with two reasoning problems. One of these prob-
lems is logically valid. One of these problems is logically
invalid. It is your task to choose which problem is valid.
Use the mouse to click the box that contains the valid argu-
ment according to you. The box around the reasoning
problem you chose will turn green, indicating that you
think it is valid. The box around the reasoning you didn’t
choose will turn red, indicating that you think it is invalid.
After every choice, use your mouse to indicate how conﬁ-
dent you are that you made the correct decision. Before
the actual experiment you will be presented with 6 prac-
tice trials to ensure that you understand the instructions.
After the practice trials the actual experiment begins. If
you have any questions ask the experimenter before or
during the practice trials.’’
The participants then completed six practice trials (two
believable, two unbelievable and two neutral). No accuracy
feedback was provided. If the participants had no further
questions after completing the practice trials, they were
told to complete the 48 experimental trials at their own
pace. Problems were presented to each participant in a
uniquely randomised order. For every problem, two
syllogisms were shown side by side. Both syllogisms had
identical conclusions and item contents. When one of the
response options was chosen by clicking on it, the border
of the box containing the chosen syllogism turned green
and the word ‘‘VALID’’ appeared underneath. Simulta-
neously, the border of the box containing the remaining
syllogism turned red and the word ‘‘INVALID’’ appeared
underneath. Participants were allowed to change their
selection as often as they wished by clicking the other
box, although they rarely did so (<2% changes). After the
experiment participants were thanked and debriefed.
2.1.4. Measures and design
The participant’s choice of argument (left vs. right) and
the accuracy of the choice (whether the valid response was
chosen) was recorded on every trial. The experiment had a
one-way design with problem type (believable vs.
unbelievable vs. neutral) manipulated within subjects.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Data treatment
Given the binary nature of our outcome variables, we
used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with a logit
link, binomially distributed residuals, and contrast coding
to analyze our data (e.g., Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily,
2013; Jaeger, 2008). Models were ﬁt using the glmer()
function from the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, &
Bolker, 2013; implemented in R statistics, R Core Team,
2012). Formal model speciﬁcations for each reported
analysis can be found in Appendix B. We tested for signif-
icance using likelihood ratio tests (LRT; e.g., Bates, 2010)
where possible and Wald tests otherwise. LRTs consist ofcomparisons between full models and nested, more
restricted models. The difference in ﬁt between both mod-
els (deviance) is then compared with a v2 distribution with
degrees of freedom equal to the amount of constrained
parameters to see if the imposed restriction signiﬁcantly
reduces the ﬁt of the model. Signiﬁcant reductions in ﬁt
indicate that constraining the parameters to be equal is
not afforded by the data (i.e., that there is an effect). Tests
for spatial bias and above chance performance used Wald
tests because LRTs are infeasible for intercept-only models.
All results are reported in terms of both log-odds (LO) and
proportions correct. These marginal means were calculated
by transforming the LO parameter estimates into a proba-
bilities using the inverse logit function.
2.2.2. Preliminary analyzes
To rule out bias based on spatial position, we ﬁt an
intercept only logit GLMM with left selections as the
dependent variable (dummy coded 1 = left, 0 = right).
There was no preference for the left or the right argument,
LO = 0.08, z = 1.13, p = .26. The overall probability of choos-
ing the argument in the left position was 52%.
We also tested whether performance was above chance
overall using an intercept only logit GLMM with correct
responses as the dependent variable (1 = correct, 0 = incor-
rect). Participants responded signiﬁcantly above chance,
LO = 0.76, z = 5.40, p < .001. Overall proportion correct
was 68%.
2.2.3. Believable vs. unbelievable
A summary of performance can be found in Table 2. The
critical test for an effect of beliefs on reasoning was the
comparison of the believable and unbelievable conditions.
We analyzed correct responses (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect)
as a function of problem type (believable vs. unbelievable)
using a logit GLMM. There was no signiﬁcant difference in
proportion correct between the believable and unbeliev-
able problems, v2(1) = 0.19, p = .66.
A neutral problem type was also included as a baseline
condition against which to compare the believable and
unbelievable problem types. Logit GLMM regression of
problem type (believable vs. unbelievable vs. neutral) on
correct responses revealed that there was no effect of prob-
lem type, v2(2) = 0.65, p = .72.
2.3. Discussion
If unbelievable conclusions encourage people to reason
more effectively, participants should have been more
accurate on unbelievable trials. We observed no signiﬁcant
Table 3











No piffures are dogs No piffures are dogs
Some animals are not
dogs [B]
Some dogs are not
animals [U]
Conﬂict Some dogs are piffures Some dogs are piffures
No piffures are animals No piffures are animals
Some dogs are not
animals [U]
Some animals are not
dogs [B]
Note: In the actual Experiment all four ﬁgures and both conclusion
directions were used to ensure that both sets of premises were not always
identical. The valid argument was presented on the left half the time and
on the right half the time. [B] = believable conclusion, [U] = unbelievable
conclusion.
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believable conditions. This null result is more difﬁcult to
interpret than a positive result because it lends itself to
several possibilities. It might be that having to think about
two arguments side by side causes people to ignore beliefs
altogether. This would be surprising given that pre-exist-
ing beliefs seem to be so difﬁcult to ignore when argu-
ments are presented in isolation. Nevertheless, the
implications are interesting and we will consider in due
course how forced choice judgments could alter reasoning
strategies. A less dramatic possibility, one consistent with
the ﬁndings of Dube et al. (2010), is that conclusion believ-
ability only affects response bias.2 If this were the case, one
would expect identical accuracy for believable and unbeliev-
able trials. This possibility will be examined in the next
experiment.
3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we ensured that logic and belief were
uncorrelated, eliminating the possibility that a simple
belief-driven response bias could inﬂuence responding. In
this experiment we reintroduced this possibility by
creating two problem types in which logic and belief were
perfectly correlated. For the non-conﬂict problems, logic
and belief were perfectly positively correlated: the valid
syllogism always had a believable conclusion and the inva-
lid syllogism always had an unbelievable conclusion (top
row of Table 3). For the conﬂict problems, logic and belief
were perfectly negatively correlated: the valid syllogism
always had an unbelievable conclusion and the invalid
syllogism always had a believable conclusion (see bottom
row of Table 3). If people are biased toward endorsing
believable conclusions, the proportion of correct choices
should be higher in the non-conﬂict condition where the2 It is well known in SDT that under certain conditions, evidence can
change without altering judgment accuracy, resulting in performance
similar to a shift in response bias. When describing the data, we refer to
patterns as being consistent or inconsistent with response bias, but
consider the alternative interpretation in the ﬁnal discussion.believable conclusion is always valid, relative to the con-




A total of 23 participants took part in exchange for
course credit. Four participants were male and 19 were
female (age 18–25, M = 20, SD = 2).
3.1.2. Materials
Materials were constructed according to the same
principles as in Experiment 1, with the exception that the
non-conﬂict and conﬂict problem types were substituted
for the believable and unbelievable ones. Non-conﬂict prob-
lems consisted of a valid–believable syllogism presented
alongside an invalid–unbelievable one. Conﬂict problems
contained a valid–unbelievable syllogism presented along-
side an invalid–believable one. The neutral problems were
included for consistencywith Experiment 1. A unique prob-
lem list containing48problems (16non-conﬂict, 16 conﬂict,
16 neutral) was constructed for each participant by
randomly assigning item contents to syllogistic structures.
3.1.3. Procedure, measures, and design
The procedure and measures were the same as in
Experiment 1. The participant’s choice of argument (left
vs. right) and the accuracy of the choice (whether the valid
response was chosen) was recorded on every trial. The
experiment had a one-way design with problem type




To rule out bias based on spatial position, we ﬁt an
intercept only logit GLMM with left selections as the
dependent variable (dummy coded 1 = left, 0 = right).
There was no evidence for spatial bias, LO = 0.03, z = 0.48,
p = .63. Participants chose the left argument 51% of the
time.
We tested whether participants responded above
chance using an intercept only logit GLMM with correct
responses as the dependent variable. Performance was sig-
niﬁcantly above chance, LO = 0.87, z = 6.16, p < .001. Mean
proportion correct was 70%.
3.2.2. Non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict
A summary of performance can be found in Table 4. To
test for the possibility of response bias we performed a
logit GLMM analysis on correct responses with problem
type (non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict) as the predictor. There was
no effect of problem type on correct responses,
v2(1) = 0.41, p = .52.
Performance on the non-conﬂict and conﬂict problem
types was compared with the neutral baseline. Logit
GLMM (problem type: non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict vs. neutral)
on correct responses revealed no difference between the
problem types, v2(2) = 0.41, p = .81.
Table 4
Log Odds and Proportion Correct in Experiment 2.
Non-conﬂict Conﬂict Neutral
Log Odds 1.03 (0.20) 0.79 (0.27) 0.92 (0.18)
Proportion Correct .74 .69 .71
Note. Standard errors in parenthesis. Proportion correct is calculated on
the basis of the log odds.
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Although participants were clearly engaged in the task
(accuracy was well above chance), we again found no evi-
dence for an effect of beliefs on endorsement rates. In
Experiment 1, participants did not reason more accurately
when faced with unbelievable conclusions. In Experiment
2, participants displayed no preference for believable
conclusions. These ﬁndings are surprising given that the
motivation of the experiments was to follow up on previ-
ous ROC work reporting accuracy and response bias effects
(Dube et al., 2010; Trippas et al., 2013). At ﬁrst glance, they
also seem to be at odds with most extant theories of belief
bias; we will examine this more closely in the ﬁnal discus-
sion. The most obvious explanation for the null results is
that the forced choice format led participants to ignore
beliefs altogether. This may seem improbable given the
known difﬁculty of ignoring beliefs when arguments are
presented in isolation. However, support for this explana-
tion might be found in selective processing theory (e.g.,
Evans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2000) which argues that
reasoning proceeds from the conclusion to the premises.
Manipulations that encourage reasoning from premises
to conclusion are known to reduce belief bias effects
(Morley, Evans, & Handley, 2004). Perhaps the simulta-
neous presentation of two adjacent syllogisms in the
forced choice format encourages a focus on syllogistic
structure rather than problem content. This results in a
premise-to-conclusion reasoning strategy in which
the premises of both arguments are compared and
processed simultaneously. We examined this possibility
in Experiment 3.
4. Experiment 3
In this experiment, the forced choice procedure was
modiﬁed to induce a conclusion-to-premise reasoning
strategy in the hopes of making the reasoning process
more similar to the single probe method traditionally used
to study belief bias. In the previous experiments, partici-
pants were presented with two complete syllogisms, each
composed of two premises and a conclusion, at the onset of
the trial. In Experiment 3, participants were initially
presented with two conclusions in the absence of the pre-
mises. The participant then had to select one conclusion in
order to reveal its premises, forcing participants to reason
about each argument in turn. The non-simultaneous pre-
sentation would make it difﬁcult to directly compare the
structures of the two problems. If the absence of belief
effects in the previous experiments were due to the proce-
dural artefact of simultaneous presentation, we should
now ﬁnd an effect of beliefs.All of the critical problem types from the previous
experiments were included in this experiment. Our pri-
mary interest was in the effect of beliefs on the quality of
reasoning. If unbelievable conclusions encourage more
effective reasoning, accuracy should be higher for the
unbelievable compared to the believable problems. In the
absence of a difference between the unbelievable and
believable conditions, a comparison of the non-conﬂict
and conﬂict problems allows a test for belief-based
response bias. A bias toward accepting believable conclu-
sions would produce higher accuracy in the non-conﬂict
compared to the conﬂict problems.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
A total of 53 people (18 of which were male) took place
in exchange for course credit (age: range = 18–31, M = 20,
SD = 3).
4.1.2. Materials
Materials were constructed as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Participants were presented with all four critical problem
types (believable, unbelievable, non-conﬂict, conﬂict) for
a total of 64 problems (16 of each type). The problems
were presented in a fully randomized order, with unique
randomisation for each participant.
4.1.3. Procedure, measures, and design
The procedure was identical to the procedure in the
previous experiments with the exception that the argu-
ments were no longer presented simultaneously. On each
trial, participants were presented with two boxes contain-
ing only a conclusion. Upon clicking one of the boxes, the
premises associated with that syllogism appeared, allow-
ing the participant to reason about its validity while the
premises of the other syllogism remained hidden. Clicking
the other box revealed the premises associated with that
syllogism and made the premises of the other syllogism
disappear. Participants were therefore only able to see
one problem at a time. The participants were allowed to
switch between the two problems as often as they desired.
The recorded response was the box that was ultimately
selected. The participant’s choice of argument (left vs.
right) and the accuracy of the choice was recorded on
every trial. Problem type (non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict; believ-
able vs. unbelievable) was manipulated within subjects.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Preliminary analyzes
To rule out bias based on spatial position, we ﬁt an
intercept only logit GLMM with left selections as the
dependent variable (dummy coded 1 = left, 0 = right).
There was no signiﬁcant preference toward either side,
LO = 0.05, z = 1.51, p = .13. The average proportion of
left selections was 49%.
We tested whether the participants reasoned above
chance using logit GLMM analysis on correct responses
(correct = 1, incorrect = 0). Performance was above chance,
Table 5




Log Odds 1.00 (0.12) 1.44 (0.17) 1.31 (0.14) 1.16
(0.15)
P(Correct) .73 .81 .79 .76
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Proportion correct is calculated on
the basis of the log odds.
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was 76%.4.2.2. Believable vs. unbelievable
A summary of performance can be found in Table 5. We
tested for qualitative effects of beliefs on reasoning by
comparing proportion correct between the believable and
unbelievable problem types using a logit GLMMwith prob-
lem type (believable vs. unbelievable) as predictor. There
was a signiﬁcant effect of problem type on correct
responses v2(1) = 5.70, p = .017.4.2.3. Non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict
A comparison of the non-conﬂict and conﬂict problem
types using a logit GLMM revealed no signiﬁcant effect of
problem type on correct responses, v2(1) = 0.54, p = .46.4.3. Discussion
Modifying the forced choice procedure so that premises
were no longer presented simultaneously resulted in sig-
niﬁcantly greater accuracy for unbelievable than for
believable trials, the ﬁrst indication so far of an effect of
beliefs. The results provide converging evidence for
Trippas et al.’s (2013) ﬁnding, based on the analysis of
ROCs, that belief bias involves a change in the quality of
reasoning and is not solely the product of response bias.
Equally interesting is what the results imply about the
forced choice method. The divergent ﬁndings of
Experiments 1 and 3 reveal the importance of presentation
format in shaping reasoning strategies. We hypothesized
that having both arguments fully available at once encour-
ages participants to focus on argument structure, compar-
ing them from premise to conclusion in a manner known
to reduce belief bias (Morley et al., 2004). Avoiding the
inﬂuence of beliefs on reasoning is notoriously difﬁcult,
and a presentation format that achieves this is noteworthy.
Our primary interest, however, lies with the results
achieved in Experiment 3 using non-simultaneous
presentation. Having to consider the arguments one at a
time produced a belief bias effect more in keeping with
that observed when arguments are judged in isolation.
One could argue, of course, that the source of the effect
in the two tasks is not necessarily the same. After all, the
null results of Experiments 1 and 2 show that forced choice
can alter the way that people reason. In the remaining
experiments, we sought not only to replicate these results
but to ﬁnd additional convergence with belief bias effects
observed using traditional methods.5. Experiment 4
The results of Experiment 3 provide new evidence that
beliefs have a qualitative effect on the reasoning process.
However, theories of belief bias that predict such an effect
have largely been developed in the context of studies using
the traditional method of presenting arguments in isola-
tion. In order to establish the relevance of our ﬁndings to
the larger body of theory, it would be desirable to provide
further evidence of the similarity between forced choice
results and those produced with traditional methods.
Trippas et al. (2013) found that not only did beliefs affect
the accuracy of validity judgments but that this was
mediated by individual differences. Participants of higher
cognitive ability reasoned more accurately when faced
with unbelievable conclusions. Those of lower cognitive
ability failed to show this beneﬁt although, consistent with
a response bias, they were more accepting of believable
conclusions. The pattern makes intuitive sense: enhanced
reasoning strategies require more sophisticated knowledge
or greater motivation while a heuristic bias requires
neither. Experiment 4 aimed to replicate the results of
Experiment 3 with an added test of cognitive ability. Pro-
viding new evidence for the role of individual differences
in belief bias would be interesting by itself, but it would
also further establish that the reasoning process involved
in the forced choice task used here is similar to that
involved in making judgments about isolated arguments.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
A total of 108 undergraduate psychology students (17
male) from Plymouth University volunteered to take part
in the experiment in exchange for course credit (age:
range = 18–40, M = 20, SD = 4).
5.1.2. Materials
The materials were constructed in the same way as in
Experiment 3. All participants were presented with believ-
able, unbelievable, non-conﬂict, and conﬂict problems for a
total of 64 trials to test for qualitative belief effects and
response bias.
Cognitive ability was measured using the AH4 group
test of general intelligence (Heim, 1970). This test has been
shown to be linked to deductive reasoning and belief bias
(Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004;
Trippas et al., 2013).
5.1.3. Procedure, measures, and design
The procedure was very similar to that of the previous
experiment with the exception that cognitive ability was
measured prior to the reasoning task.
Following Trippas et al. (2013), we performed a median
split on cognitive ability to divide our sample into a higher
cognitive ability group and a lower cognitive ability group
(the results did not change when cognitive ability was
included as a continuous predictor, see Appendix C). For
the reasoning task, the participant’s choice of argument
(left vs. right) and the accuracy of the choice was recorded
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To rule out bias based on spatial position, we ﬁt an
intercept only logit GLMM with left selections as the
dependent variable (dummy coded 1 = left, 0 = right). Par-
ticipants had no preference for either box, LO = 0.04,
z = 1.57, p = .12. The left box was chosen approximately
49% of the time.
We tested whether participants reasoned above chance
using an intercept only logit GLMM with correct responses
(1 = correct, 0 = incorrect) as predictor. Participants per-
formed signiﬁcantly above chance, LO = 0.92, z = 12.39,
p < .001. On average, participants selected the correct
response 72% of the time.
5.2.2. Believable vs. unbelievable
A summary of performance can be found in Table 6.
Using a logit GLMM, we regressed correct responses
(1 = correct, 0 = incorrect) on problem type (believable vs.
unbelievable), cognitive ability (higher vs. lower), and the
interaction between both. Accuracy was higher for the
higher cognitive ability group, v2(1) = 8.55, p = .003. There
was no main effect of believability, v2(1) = 0.06, p = .80.
However, problem type and cognitive ability interacted,
indicating that the effect of problem type differed for the
higher and lower ability groups, v2(1) = 6.42, p = .011. Fol-
low up tests indicated that the higher ability participants
reasoned better for the unbelievable problems compared
to the believable problems, v2(1) = 5.66, p = .017. The
lower ability participants showed a trend in the opposite
direction, v2(1) = 3.26, p = .07.
5.2.3. Non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict
Using logit GLMM, we regressed correct responses
(1 = correct, 0 = incorrect) on problem type (non-conﬂict
vs. conﬂict), cognitive ability (higher vs. lower), and the
interaction between both. A main effect of problem type
demonstrated that accuracy was higher for the for the
non-conﬂict compared to the conﬂict problems,
v2(1) = 11.42, p < .001. A main effect of cognitive ability
demonstrated that accuracy was higher for the higher abil-
ity group, v2(1) = 13.59, p < .001. Conﬂict and ability did
not interact, v2(1) = 1.44, p = .23. Interpreting the effect
of conﬂict is not straightforward when beliefs are shownTable 6
Log Odds and Proportion Correct as a function of cognitive ability of Experiment
Believable
Higher CA Log Odds 1.17 (0.12)
P(Correct) .76
Lower CA Log Odds 0.78 (0.09)
P(Correct) .69
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Proportion correct is calculated on the basto affect accuracy. For the lower ability group, which did
not show an accuracy effect, these results reveal that
beliefs still exert an inﬂuence, albeit in a manner consis-
tent with pure response bias.
5.3. Discussion
We replicated the ﬁnding from Experiment 3 of
enhanced reasoning for unbelievable conclusions. This
facilitation was observed only for the higher cognitive
ability group. For the lower ability group, conclusion
believability did not enhance reasoning accuracy, although
performance during non-conﬂict and conﬂict trials was
consistent with a bias to endorse believable conclusions.
The full pattern of results correspond with the ﬁndings of
Trippas et al. (2013), strengthening the argument that
the non-simultaneous forced choice judgment engages
the reasoning process in much the same way as the tradi-
tional single probe judgment. More important to our
understanding of belief bias, the results offer independent
support for the claim that beliefs alter the quality of rea-
soning in a manner mediated by individual differences.6. Experiment 5
Trippas et al. (2013) speculated that the tendency to
engage in belief-driven enhanced reasoning strategies
might be as much a matter of motivation as of ability. Ana-
lytic cognitive style is another aspect of personality
thought to play an important role in reasoning (Toplak,
West, & Stanovich, 2011, 2014). Cognitive style
encompasses not only the capacity to engage in analytic
processing but also the motivation to do so. In Experiment
5, we extended our investigation of individual differences
to the effect of cognitive style on belief bias.
We also scrutinized the effect of beliefs on the lower
cognitive ability group which was apparent only in the
non-conﬂict and conﬂict trials. The trend in Experiment
3, although in the same direction, was small and not signif-
icant. Because this may have been due to aggregating
across ability groups, it would be good to replicate the
clear pattern that emerged in Experiment 4 when individ-
ual differences were taken into account. An additional
manipulation was introduced to test the plausibility of
characterizing the pattern as a response bias. Response
heuristics are often strategic in nature (Gigerenzer &
Brighton, 2009). Although the preference for accepting
believable conclusions may be deeply rooted in experience,
it may also be attuned to local contingencies. A problem
with mixing non-conﬂict and conﬂict problems together4.
Unbelievable Non-conﬂict Conﬂict
1.61 (0.22) 1.37 (0.13) 1.08 (0.20)
.82 .80 .75
0.56 (0.11) 0.95 (0.10) 0.29 (0.13)
.64 .72 .57
is of the log odds.
Table 7
Log Odds and Proportion Correct as a function of analytic cognitive style for
unbelievable and believable problems in Experiment 5.
Believable Unbelievable
Higher ACS Log Odds 0.93 (0.16) 1.44 (0.22)
Proportion Correct .71 .81
Lower ACS Log Odds 0.82 (0.13) 0.61 (0.17)
Proportion Correct .70 .65
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Proportion correct is calculated on
the basis of the log odds.
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latter, which account for half of the trials in the experi-
ment, responding based on conclusion believability alone
is not possible. This may cause participants to discard their
otherwise habitual use of a simple, belief-based heuristic.
To examine this possibility, we blocked the conditions.
Some participants were exposed to only non-conﬂict and
conﬂict trials in the ﬁrst half of the list and only believable
and unbelievable trials in the second half. Other
participants were exposed to the conditions in the reverse
order. If exposure to believable and unbelievable trials is
responsible for suppressing a bias to accept believable con-
clusions, the accuracy difference between non-conﬂict and
conﬂict problems should be most pronounced when par-
ticipants are initially exposed to only these problems.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
A total of 71 undergraduate psychology students (8
male) from Plymouth University volunteered to take part
in the experiment in exchange for course credit (age:
range = 18–54, M = 23, SD = 7).
6.1.2. Materials
The materials were constructed as in Experiments 3 and
4. All participants were presented with believable, unbe-
lievable, non-conﬂict, and conﬂict problems for a total of
64 trials to test for enhanced reasoning and consistency
with response bias.
Analytic cognitive style (ACS) was tested using the CRT
(Frederick, 2005), considered to be a short and efﬁcient
performance measure of analytic cognitive style (e.g.,
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012;
Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013). The test
involves answering three questions which cue an intui-
tively compelling (but incorrect) response. For instance:
‘‘If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long
does it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?’’ The intu-
itive response in this case is to use a matching heuristic
and to respond ‘‘100.’’ However, participants with ade-
quate levels of analytic cognitive style will realize that this
is not the case, given that it takes one machine ﬁve min-
utes to make one widget. The ability to inhibit the intuitive
responses in the CRT has been linked to rational thinking
ability and actively open-minded thinking, two alternative
measures of analytic cognitive style (Campetilli & Gerrans,
2013; Toplak et al., 2011, 2014).
6.1.3. Procedure, measures, and design
The procedure was identical to that of the previous
experiments with the exception that upon completing
the experiment, the participants were asked to complete
the CRT. Participants were assigned to the lower analytic
cognitive style group if they did not correctly solve any
of the three CRT questions (n = 42). For the reasoning task,
the participant’s choice of argument (left vs. right) and the
accuracy of the choice was recorded on every trial.
The design differed from the previous experiments in
that the problem types were blocked. For half of the partic-
ipants, the ﬁrst 32 problems consisted of only believableand unbelievable trials and the ﬁnal 32 problems consisted
of only non-conﬂict and conﬂict trials. For the remaining
participants, the reverse was true. Participants were not
informed about the blocked nature of this design and there
was no pause in between the lists. The intent of the design
modiﬁcation was to control for the inﬂuence of the believ-
able vs. unbelievable trials on heuristic strategies adopted
for non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict trials. Problem type (non-
conﬂict vs. conﬂict; believable vs. unbelievable) was
manipulated within subjects, and analytic cognitive style
(higher vs. lower) was a between-subjects factor.
6.2. Results
6.2.1. Preliminary analyzes
To rule out bias based on spatial position, we ﬁt an
intercept only logit GLMM with left selections as the
dependent variable (dummy coded 1 = left, 0 = right).
There was no spatial bias, LO = 0.05, z = 1.56, p = .12.
Approximately 49% of the times the box on the left was
selected.
To test whether the participants reasoned above chance
we ﬁt an intercept only logit GLMM to correct responses
(correct = 1, incorrect = 0). Participants performed
signiﬁcantly above chance, LO = 0.82, z = 8.97, p < .001.
The probability of giving the correct response was 69% on
average.
6.2.2. Believable vs. unbelievable
A summary of performance can be found in Table 7. We
analyzed correct responses (correct = 1, incorrect = 0)
using a GLMM logit regression model with a full factorial
2 (problem type: believable vs. unbelievable)  2 (analytic
cognitive style: higher vs. lower)  2 (block order: non-
conﬂict vs. conﬂict trials presented ﬁrst vs. presented last)
design. Analytic cognitive style and problem type inter-
acted, v2(1) = 11.73, p < .001. Follow up tests demonstrated
that beliefs increased reasoning accuracy for the higher
ACS group, v2(1) = 6.54, p = .011. There was no effect of
believability for the lower ACS group, v2(1) = 2.14,
p = .14. No other effects were signiﬁcant, all ps > .12.
6.2.3. Non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict
A summary of performance can be found in Table 8.
Correct responses were analyzed using a GLMM logit
regression with a full factorial 2 (problem type: non-con-
ﬂict vs. conﬂict)  2 (analytic cognitive style: higher vs.
lower)  2 (block order: non-conﬂict and conﬂict trials
presented ﬁrst vs. presented last) design. The main effect
Table 8
Log Odds and Proportion Correct as a function of analytic cognitive style and presentation order of non-conﬂict and conﬂict problems in Experiment 5.
Presented ﬁrst Presented last
Non-conﬂict Conﬂict Non-conﬂict Conﬂict
Higher ACS Log Odds 1.64 (0.36) 1.32 (0.34) 1.02 (0.22) 0.86 (0.35)
P(correct) .84 .79 .73 .70
Lower ACS Log Odds 2.09 (0.36) 0.29 (0.40) 0.63 (0.13) 0.20 (0.19)
P(correct) .89 .43 .65 .55
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Proportion correct is calculated on the basis of the log odds.
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non-conﬂict compared to the conﬂict problems,
v2(1) = 10.55, p = .001. The main effect of analytic cognitive
style indicated that accuracy was higher for the higher ACS
group, v2(1) = 4.77, p = .029. The main effect of block order
indicated that accuracy was higher overall when the non-
conﬂict and conﬂict trials were presented ﬁrst,
v2(1) = 5.94, p = .015. These main effects were qualiﬁed
by several interactions. Problem type and analytic cogni-
tive style interacted, v2(1) = 6.68, p = .001, suggesting that
the effect of problem type was larger for the lower ACS
group. Problem type and block order also interacted,
v2(1) = 5.46, p = .019, suggesting that the effect of problem
type was more pronounced if the non-conﬂict and conﬂict
trials were presented ﬁrst. The three-way interaction
between problem type, analytic cognitive style, and block
order was also signiﬁcant, v2(1) = 4.40, p = .036. This led
us to perform follow up analyses for the higher and lower
cognitive style groups separately.
For the higher ACS group, the 2 (problem type)  2
(block order) GLMM logit regression did not produce any
effects, all ps > .27. For the lower ACS group, the same anal-
ysis resulted in main effects of problem type, v2(1) = 11.92,
p < .001, and block order, v2(1) = 6.64, p = .010. Finally,
problem type and block interacted, v2(1) = 8.63, p = .003,
showing that the effect of problem type was larger when
the non-conﬂict and conﬂict trials were presented ﬁrst.6.3. Discussion
Replicating the ﬁndings of the previous two experi-
ments, participants reasoned more accurately when faced
with unbelievable conclusions. Analytic cognitive style
mediated this effect. Similar to the pattern observed with
cognitive ability in Experiment 4, only the higher ACS
group showed enhanced reasoning on unbelievable trials.
The effect may be due in part to higher ACS individuals
possessing greater cognitive ability. However, as De Neys,
Rossi, and Houdé (2013) observed, many people still
choose an intuitively compelling response even when they
suspect it may be incorrect. Higher ACS participants may
possess not only the knowledge to reason effectively but
also the motivation or impulse control to ignore easier
but less accurate strategies.
In Experiment 4, the lower cognitive ability group
showed no difference in the quality of their reasoning
about believable and unbelievable problems. However,
beliefs did inﬂuence their performance during non-conﬂict
and conﬂict trials in a manner consistent with a bias toaccept believable conclusions. In Experiment 5, the lower
ACS group showed a similar pattern of performance during
non-conﬂict and conﬂict trials. We suspected that the use
of simple, belief-based heuristics, while habitual, may also
be sensitive to local contingencies. Non-conﬂict and con-
ﬂict problems make responding based on conclusion
believability possible and even reasonable. Believable and
unbelievable problems, on the other hand, remove the
heuristic as an option and in doing so may discourage its
use. We hypothesized that participants who were initially
given only non-conﬂict and conﬂict trials would be more
likely to use heuristic responding than those who began
the session with unbelievable and believable trials. There-
fore, the ﬁnding that differential responding to non-
conﬂict and conﬂict problems was more pronounced when
these trials were presented ﬁrst rather than last in the ses-
sion suggests to us that response bias is driving this effect.
Interestingly, the improved reasoning about unbelievable
problems of the higher ACS group did not depend on pre-
sentation order. This suggests that the critical effects
observed in the non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict trials and unbe-
lievable vs. believable trials are tied to different
mechanisms.7. General discussion
A number of competing theories have arisen over the
years to explain belief bias, the inﬂuence of pre-existing
beliefs on judgments of logical validity. The predominant
view has been that belief bias has two components.
Response bias, the more basic component, is the tendency
to accept believable conclusions as valid, regardless of
their actual validity. Response bias describes a simple heu-
ristic that inﬂuences endorsement rates without affecting
the accuracy of validity judgments. Beliefs may also inﬂu-
ence the quality of reasoning. Although theories differ on
the speciﬁc mechanism, the major theories suggest that
people tend to reason more diligently, and thus more accu-
rately, when confronted with unbelievable conclusions.
Evidence for a qualitative effect of beliefs on reasoning
has traditionally focused on the interaction between con-
clusion believability and validity that is often observed in
argument endorsement rates. However, recent work taking
a formal modeling approach has shown that interpreting
such interactions requires assumptions whose empirical
and theoretical justiﬁcation is open to question (Dube
et al., 2010; Heit & Rotello, 2014; Klauer et al., 2000).
Applying a SDT model to their own syllogistic reasoning
data, Dube et al. found no evidence for enhanced
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belief  logic interactions could arise solely as a conse-
quence of changes in response bias.
7.1. Theoretical implications
The work critical of traditional methods of analyzing
belief bias, in particular Dube et al.’s (2010) argument that
pure response bias account offers a viable alternative to
more complex theories, suggests a need to reconsider the
evidence for a dual component view of belief bias.
Trippas et al. (2013), using ROC analysis based on the
SDT model, found that beliefs did affect the accuracy, and
therefore the quality, of syllogistic reasoning under certain
conditions. When the task discouraged extended analytic
processing by using simple problems or time pressure,
belief bias could be accounted for purely in terms of a sim-
ple response bias. The qualitative effect of beliefs emerged
with complex problems, self-paced responding, and most
interestingly, only in the subset of participants scoring
higher on measures of cognitive ability. In a sense, these
ﬁndings can accommodate both the dual component and
pure response bias accounts if it is assumed that each holds
under conditions. There is reason, however, to view this
conclusion as preliminary. Although the analysis of conﬁ-
dence rating-based ROCs in reasoning has strong advocates
(e.g., Pazzaglia, Dube, & Rotello, 2013), there remains
debate about its use (Klauer & Kellen, 2011; Dube et al.,
2011). Trippas et al. (2013) attributed the conﬂicting
results of their study and that of Dube et al. (2010) to indi-
vidual differences causing variation across samples. An
explanation based on individual differences requires repli-
cation and independent veriﬁcation.
Two-alternative forced choice is a task with properties
that are well understood within the framework of SDT.
This makes it a natural vehicle for seeking converging
evidence with prior work using ROC methods. That said,
the ability to control response bias in forced choice
makes it a useful tool to test for effects of beliefs on
reasoning regardless of theoretical perspective. In Experi-
ments 3–5, we conﬁrmed that beliefs do inﬂuence the
quality of reasoning. We also showed that enhanced
reasoning for unbelievable conclusions depends on indi-
vidual differences such as cognitive ability and analytic
cognitive style. In sum, our ﬁndings replicate and extend
the ﬁndings of Trippas et al. (2013) using this novel
methodology.
If response bias alone is not sufﬁcient to account for
belief bias, which of the traditional theories can best
account for our ﬁndings? Mental models theory (MMT;
Oakhill et al., 1989) explicitly proposes a premises-to-
conclusion reasoning strategy in which a tentative
conclusion is generated from the premises, with an addi-
tional search for counterexamples if that initial conclu-
sion is unbelievable. Under this account, we would have
expected an accuracy advantage for unbelievable prob-
lems in Experiment 1. Selective processing theory (SPT:
Evans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2000) fares slightly better
in explaining the discrepancy between Experiments 1 and
3. According to SPT, belief bias emerges from a conclu-
sion-to-premises reasoning process. Participants ﬁrstevaluate the believability of the premises, after which
they conduct either a positive test if the conclusion is
believable or a negative test if it is unbelievable. For com-
plex indeterminately invalid syllogisms of the type used
in our experiments, multiple representations of the
premises exist (some of which are compatible with the
premises, others incompatible). As such, the negative test
cued by the unbelievable conclusion will lead to
increased rejection of invalid arguments, resulting in
higher judgment accuracy. Conversely, the positive test
cued by believable conclusions will lead to the increased
acceptance of invalid arguments, resulting in lower
judgment accuracy. For valid complex syllogisms, only
compatible models exist, and consequently alternate
belief-based testing strategies do not result in any differ-
ences in judgment accuracy. SPT does not explicitly take
individual differences into account and so has little to
say about their role in the ﬁndings from Experiments 4
and 5. There has been one previous attempt to extend
SPT to individual differences. Stupple, Ball, Evans, and
Kamal-Smith (2011) used latency analysis to show that
distinct subgroups existed among reasoners in a belief
bias task. One subgroup appeared to operate in a manner
wholly consistent with response bias, while other groups
showed enhanced reasoning or perfectly normative
reasoning.
Our ﬁndings are also compatible with dual process the-
ory, which suggests that enhanced reasoning is driven by
effortful, reﬂective Type 2 (T2) processing. A key determi-
nant of T2 processing is its link with the recruitment of
working memory. Higher ability participants presumably
have a larger working memory capacity, which is consis-
tent with the idea that those of higher cognitive ability
engage more effortful reasoning under certain conditions.
This focus on individual differences resonates with sugges-
tions made by other proponents of dual process theory
(e.g., De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). The two components of
belief bias have often been cited as one of the key pieces
of evidence for the dual process view (Evans & Stanovich,
2013). According to DPT, the response bias component of
belief bias is driven by Type 1 (T1) processing and the
accuracy component is a marker for T2 processing. With
respect to the current ﬁndings, DPT would predict that
under conditions that discourage effortful processing, such
as working memory load or response deadlines, the effect
of beliefs on accuracy should disappear even in those with
higher cognitive ability or ACS. The effect of beliefs on heu-
ristic bias, in contrast, should be unaffected or even
facilitated.
The claim that beliefs inﬂuence the quality of reason-
ing lies at the heart of the various theories described
above. In using the forced-choice procedure, our aim
was to provide clear evidence of this using methodology
that can control for changes in performance due to
response bias. Therefore, performance in the unbeliev-
able vs. believable trials make up the critical results of
the study. However, it is a prevalent, albeit usually infor-
mal, assumption that people are often biased toward
accepting believable arguments regardless of their valid-
ity. As a secondary aspect of our investigation, we used
performance in the non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict trials to test
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affect judgment accuracy. We should be clear, however,
that although response bias would produce an accuracy
advantage for non-conﬂict problems, there is another
possible explanation for this result. Imagine that believ-
able conclusions, regardless of validity, tended to possess
more ‘‘evidence strength’’ than unbelievable conclusions.
Under certain conditions, this might not change the abil-
ity to judge validity (i.e., accuracy would be the same for
unbelievable and believable trials). However, because
believable conclusions possess more evidence strength,
participants would be more likely to choose them in
non-conﬂict and conﬂict problems. Therefore, the effects
observed in non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict trials in the later
experiments could be characterized in this way rather
than as response bias. Although this possibility is worth
investigating, the import of the non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict
results does not really depend on certainty about the
underlying mechanism. Rather, the results are interesting
because they reveal that lower cognitive ability and ana-
lytic cognitive style participants are being inﬂuenced by
beliefs, but in a seemingly different manner than higher
ability and analytic cognitive style participants. This is
not to say that differentiating response bias from other
mechanisms is impossible. One can, for example, use
manipulations that plausibly target response bias. We
suggest that the vulnerability of the non-conﬂict vs. con-
ﬂict effect to presentation order, observed in Experiment
5, is what would be expected from response bias.Table A.1
Item contents used for reasoning materials.
Category Members
amphibians frogs salamanders toads newts
birds parrots sparrows ducks robins
boats kayaks canoes yachts speedboats
cars BMWs Volvos Vauxhalls Fiats
criminals robbers murderers embezzlers terrorists
furniture desks sofas cupboards bookcases
dogs Spaniels Labradors Terriers Dalmatians
drinks beers sodas wines whiskeys
ﬁsh trout salmons cods haddocks
fruits prunes peaches apples bananas
insects bees beetles ants ﬂies
reptiles lizards iguanas snakes crocodiles
tools hammers saws spanners shovels
trees oaks willows pines maples
vegetables carrots cabbages parsnips radishes
weapons cannons swords guns spears7.2. Additional implications
Although Experiments 3–5 contribute the central ﬁnd-
ings of the study, the null ﬁndings of Experiments 1 and
2 yielded an unexpected but potentially signiﬁcant insight
into the nature of belief bias. Participants performed ade-
quately in the reasoning task, but there was no evidence
that beliefs affected the quality of reasoning, nor was there
any evidence for a belief-based response bias. We consid-
ered the possibility that the force choice method itself
removes the inﬂuence of beliefs on reasoning. However,
belief effects emerged in later experiments following a
slight modiﬁcation of the procedure. In Experiments 1
and 2, two complete syllogisms were presented side by
side. This allowed participants to directly compare the
structure of the two arguments. Comparison might natu-
rally proceed from top to bottom, in other words, from
the premises to the conclusion, given that the only differ-
ences between the arguments are present in the premises.
Morley et al. (2004) noted that premise-to-conclusion rea-
soning tends to be immune to belief bias. In Experiments
3–5, the procedure was modiﬁed so that the premises of
the two problems were no longer simultaneously visible.
Instead, both conclusions were presented and participants
had to select each to view its accompanying premises. This
resulted in belief bias effects in Experiments 3–5 analogous
to those observed with the traditional, single-probe
procedure.
Why would the simultaneous-presentation procedure
have such a different effect on reasoning? Work byPachur and Olsson (2012) on knowledge acquisition may
be informative. In one condition, learning consisted of
viewing each object in isolation and making a judgment
about its characteristics (e.g., poison level). In another
condition, learning involved viewing objects in pairs and
making a judgment about their relative characteristics
(e.g., which was more poisonous). Participants who experi-
enced single-probe learning later tended to judge charac-
teristics using an exemplar-based strategy, comparing
new objects to previously encountered objects. Those
who experienced forced-choice learning, on the other
hand, later tended toward more abstract, rule-based judg-
ments. Applied to syllogistic reasoning, it may be that
when problems are presented in isolation, people are
prone to judge validity based on prior experience, analo-
gous to an exemplar strategy. Prior experience is presum-
ably the source of belief bias. When problems are
compared side by side, people may instead tend toward
rule-based judgments, i.e., formal logic.
In reasoning and decision-making, the inﬂuence of
irrelevant beliefs is widespread and difﬁcult to avoid.
Instructing people to ignore irrelevant information and
reason deductively is rarely effective (Evans, Newstead,
Allen, & Pollard, 1994; Heit & Rotello, 2014). If the goal
is to measure reasoning ability, our ﬁndings suggest that
controlling presentation format may be a more effective
way to limit extraneous inﬂuences. As a didactic tool,
forced choice presentation may prove to be more effective
than the traditional method of presenting problems or
examples in isolation. In academic settings, the focus is
typically on learning to apply formal rules. Using side-
by-side presentation in which irrelevant factors are equa-
ted between the examples draws attention to the relevant
factors and also draws attention to broader, structural
regularities, both of which likely contribute to ﬁndings
like those of Pachur and Olsson (2012) that forced choice
learning promotes the development of rules-based
strategies.Appendix A
See Tables A.1 and A.2.
Table A.2
Pseudowords used as linking terms in the experiments.
redes fosks pives pields decottions sothods renes bunges
wasses geets swants cronxes ﬁrters nickhomes revoules pinds
foins chindles soats sonds pumes papes trops envenches
lebs brops stoges crots punties stamuses vennars cortemns
weens quinces loaxes stoals curges gruts cosuors wightes
punds jubs parfs ﬁses hoons tutches brimbers punes
cofts spashes ﬁmps brams heets piffures burtes queels
ﬂamps dathses darms vosts trinnels goples boodings veemers
Table B.1
Model speciﬁcations for analyses in Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
Analysis Model
(1) Spatial bias left1 + (1|subj)
(2) Above chance corr1 + (1|subj)
(3) Believable vs. unbelievable corr1 + unbel + (1 + unbel|subj)
(4) Non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict corr1 + noconf + (1 + noconf|subj)
(5) Full corr1 + prob_type
+ (1 + prob_type|subj)
Note: 1 = intercept, left (1 = left, 0 = right), corr (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect),
subj = participant id, unbel (1 = unbelievable problem type, 0 = believable
problem type), noconf (1 = non-conﬂict problem type, 0 = conﬂict prob-
lem type), prob_type = factor (believable vs. unbelievable vs. neutral for
Experiment 1; non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict vs. neutral for Experiment 2; not
speciﬁed in Experiment 3). Effects between parentheses are random
effects to account for the repeated measures nature of the design. The
LRTs for (3), (4) and (5) were obtained by comparing with a model in
which the ﬁxed effect of interest was removed, but the random slope of
that effect was retained.
Table B.2




(3) Believable vs. unbelievable
(4) (3) for higher CA
(5) (3) for lower CA
(6) Non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict
Note: 1 = intercept, left: (1 = left, 0 = right), corr: (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect), subj:
conﬂict, 0 = conﬂict), CA: (1 = higher cognitive ability, 0 = lower cognitive ability
interactions between those variables are included in the model, e.g.: unbel*CA =
Table B.3




(3) Believable vs. unbelievable
(4) (3) for higher ACS
(5) (3) for lower ACS
(6) Non-conﬂict vs. conﬂict
(7) (6) for higher ACS
(8) (6) for lower ACS
(9) (6) for lower ACS, presented ﬁrst
(10) (6) for lower ACS, presented last
Note: 1 = intercept, left: (1 = left, 0 = right), corr: (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect), subj =
conﬂict, 0 = conﬂict), ACS: (1 = higher analytic cognitive style, 0 = lower analyt
(1 = non-conﬂict & conﬂict items presented ﬁrst, 0 = non-conﬂict & conﬂict block
comparing with a model in which the effect under scrutiny was removed.
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In this Appendix we provide themodel speciﬁcations for
all reported analyses per experiment. The models are
described using the syntax as interpreted by the glmer func-
tion of the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2013). All models
are estimated using maximum likelihood with a logit link
function with binomially distributed residuals (see Tables
B.1–B.3). LRTs for main effects and interactions were com-
puted by comparing with a model in which the effect under
scrutiny was removed. For instance, to test for the interac-
tion between the qualitative effect of beliefs on reasoning
and cognitive ability, (3) was compared with the following
model (3b): corr1 + unbel + CA + (1 + unbel|subj). To test
for the main effect of enhanced reasoning, model (3b) was
compared with an additional model (3c): 1 + CA + (1 +
unbel|subj), and so forth.Model
left1 + (1|subj)
corr1 + (1|subj)
corr1 + unbel*CA + (1 + unbel|subj)
corr[CA==1]1 + unbel[CA==1] + (1 + unbel[CA==1]|subj[CA==1])
corr[CA==0]1 + unbel[CA==0] + (1 + unbel[CA==0]|subj[CA==0])
corr1 + noconf + (1 + noconf|subj)
= participant id, unbel: (1 = unbelievable, 0 = believable), noconf: (1 = non-
), an asterisk (*) between two variables indicates that all main effects and




corr1 + unbel*ACS*block + (1 + unbel|subj)
corr[ACS==1]1 + unbel[ACS==1]*block[ACS==1] + r_e1
corr[ACS==0]1 + unbel[ACS==0]*block[ACS==0] + r_e1
corr1 + noconf*ACS*block + (1 + noconf|subj)
corr[ACS==1]1 + noconf[ACS==1]*block[ACS==1] + r_e2
corr[ACS==0]1 + noconf[ACS==0]*block[ACS==0] + r_e2
corr[ACS==0 & block==1]noconf[ACS==0 & block==1] + r_e2
corr[ACS==0 & block==0]noconf[ACS==0 & block==0] + r_e2
participant id, unbel: (1 = unbelievable, 0 = believable), noconf: (1 = non-
ic cognitive style), r_e1 = (1 + unbel|subj), r_e2 = (1 + noconf|subj), block
presented last). LRTs for main effects and interactions were computed by
Table C.1
Effects of the enhanced reasoning analysis with cognitive ability as a
continuous predictor in Experiment 4.
Effect LO z p
Intercept 0.27 0.64 .52
Cognitive ability 0.008 1.70 .09
Problem type 1.89 3.69 <.001
Interaction 0.002 3.79 <.001
Note: Problem type: (1 = unbelievable, 0 = believable).
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In Experiment 4 we investigated the effect of cognitive
ability on the belief-accuracy effect by comparing higher
and lower cognitive ability groups using median splits.
We took this approach to allow for a direct comparison
with the effect of analytic cognitive style in Experiment
5, as well as with our previous work (Trippas et al., 2013;
2014). The GLMM approach allows us to inspect the effect
of cognitive ability as a continuous predictor. We report
this analysis below to demonstrate that this approach
works equally well and leads to identical conclusions. In
this analysis, treatment coding was used instead of effect
coding.
We regressed correct responses (1 = correct, 0 = incor-
rect) on problem type (believable vs. unbelievable),
cognitive ability (higher values indicate higher cognitive
ability scores, range: 32–124, inter-quartile range: 78–
104, median = 90), and the interaction between both.
Effects are presented in Table C.1.
Based on these effects we plotted the estimated
probability of getting the correct response for the
believable and the unbelievable conditions as a function
of cognitive ability (see Fig. C.1).Fig. C.1. Performance on unbelievable and believable trials as a function
of cognitive ability for Experiment 4. The vertical dotted line denotes
median cognitive ability. Higher cognitive ability is associated with
enhanced accuracy for unbelievable problems.References
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